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The history of modernity’s antique dreams is to be
found in the writing out of the colonial and post
colonial moment.
—Homi Bhabha ‘“Race/ Time and the
Revision of Modernity”1

Ever since the publication of Michel Foucault’s The
Archaeology of Knowledge, and his argument not only
of the possibility but the inevitability of the new,
there has been an abundance of new times. For years
now, scholars have been “trying to detect the inci
of interruptions” beneath “the great continu
ities of thought,” in order to “suspend the continuous
accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow devel
opment, and force it to enter a new time” (Foucault,
Archaeology 4). Their success is evident in the num
ber of “posts” so prolific
post-marxism, post
feminism, post-colonialism, post-modernity. Are
these times new, however, or are they merely the
products of the abstraction of the logical process of
change from its concrete historical determinants?
The latter has been the
of many mostly Marxist
theorists, especially of postmodernity, the most
recent of new times.2 Postmodern theory’s construc
tion of the time of the present as an epistemological
structure, and its subsequent narrativization of social
ethics and subject formation, would appear to prove
them right. It is precisely these elements, though,
which also inhabit critiques of postmodernity and
make them subject to its logic.3
This paradoxical doubling or inherently dialecti
cal quality is what makes modernity both so irre-
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sistible and so problematic a category. It also ushers in the problem of moder
nity s legitimacy latent, Hans Blumenberg tells us, in its “claim to carry out a
radical break with tradition and in the incongruity between this
and the
reality of history, which can
begin entirely anew” (116). “Modernity,” he
writes in The Legitimacy ofthe Modern Age — one of the most original re-think
ings of both the substance and process of Western intellectual history — “was
the first and only age that understood itself as an epoch and, in so doing, simul
taneously created the other epochs” (116). It is in the nature of modernity to
self-propagate, he continues, because it distances itself even from the most
recent past with which it is identified. Blumenberg addresses the problem of
newness through
concept of “re-occupation.” Arguing against the popular
“secularization” thesis supported by most theorists of modernity, he tells us that
modern philosophies of history do not break from but “re-occupy” earlier posi
tions. He explicates this metaphor in terms of the contrast between “content”
and “function.” “Totally heterogeneous contents,” he states,
“take on iden
tical functions in specific positions in the system of mans interpretation of the
world and himself” (64). He views the idea of progress, for example, neither as
a secularized Christian idea nor as a modern idea affected by Christianity. In
Blumenberg’s account, it is essentially modern in its content (the initial idea of
e progress)
his the
epochsbebut heavily affected by Christianity in the functionhisthat
content is forced to perform (the function of explaining the meaning and pat
tern of history as a whole). For him, unlike Foucault, continuity underlies the
change of
and it is a continuity of problems rather than solutions, of
questions rather than of answers.
Blumenberg’s work, mostly overlooked in favor of Foucault’s more opti
mistic diagnosis of the interruptive temporality of the modern, is crucial in
understanding the contradictions in recent negotiations of modernity. It
explains, for example, the disjuncture between political desire and critical prac
tice at work in Homi Bhabha’s “'Race,’ Time, and the Revision of Modernity,”
one of the most influential contemporary theories of the new. It also explains
why Bhabha is condemned for being complicitous with the very epistemologies
that are the object of his criticism.4 That is, Blumenberg explains why
own
critique can be seen as operating at the discursive level only, despite
politi
cal desire to “slow down the linear progressive time of modernity” so that “'the
pauses and stresses of the whole performance’” can be revealed, and “our sense
of what it means to live, to be, in other times and different spaces, both human
and historical”
transformed (253, 256).5 For Blumenberg modernity
involves “a continual questioning of the conditions of existence” (242). This is
a conflicted social process of identification, interrogation and disavowal of
extraordinary complexity, which requires the constant production of new pasts
to maintain its rhythm of temporal negation and projection, as urgently as new
images of the future.
Because there is the danger of confusing this process and “the theoretical
anarchy of aporia,” Bhabha makes sure to distinguish his revision of modernity
from that of postmodern theory (245). He wonders whether the “synchronous
constancy of reconstruction and reinvention of the subject,” characteristic of the
critical discourse on modernity, “does not assume a cultural temporality that
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may not be universalist in its epistemological moment of judgement, but may,
indeed, be ethnocentric in its construction of‘cultural difference”’ (240). For
him, modernity is also about “the historical construction of a specific position
of historical enunciation and address” (243), a specific “we” that “defines the
prerogative of
present” (247). Historically, the “we” that has been defining
the present have been the Europeans. Historically, also, the colonial space pro
vided that present’s pasts and futures. It is not surprising, then, Bhabha argues,
that Europeans now use the postcolonial space to produce their most recent
“new time” of postmodernity. That space’s
of fragmentation,
to
the violent way in which the colonial encounter has intervened in its histories,
and its necessarily disjunctive narratives are the West’s metaphors of post
modernity. The
of “what it means to live, to be in other times and
different spaces, both human and historical” is erased by this metaphoric
process, which needs these other times and spaces only as abstractions—
images, styles from which to define the present. Only in the postcolonial space,
he tells us, can
find the unedited transcript of the modern that contains the
stories of “what could have been” had they not been crossed out (245). Accord
ing to him, these stories are what give modernity its characteristics of contin
gency, indeterminacy, and transitoriness and not, as postmodernism tells us,
“the endless slippage of the signifier” (245). By drawing attention to the impor
tance of colonialism in the historical constitution of modernity’s disjunctive
form, and by pointing to its displaced repetition in the postcolonial, Bhabha
wants to rethink the historiography of the modern and change the conditions
through which narratives of the new are generated. For him the “interruptive”
temporality of the postcolonial “now” with its “culturally hybrid social identi
ties” is the model of a future time where there is no gap between the lived and
the historical consciousness of the present (250).
Several critics have taken issue with Bhabha’s bid on behalf of “the hege
mony of the concept of the postcolonial” as the site of the modern. “There is
not necessarily anything specifically postcolonial’ about the reproduction of the
more general structure [of displaced repetition],” Peter Osborne writes in The
Politics of
“although the repetition of colonial differences is currently
of its most important, and hence most heavily contested sites” (199). For
Osborne, the general structure that Bhabha identifies as particular to postcolo
nial modernity is the very structure that characterizes the post-Enlightenment
production of modernity as the social process of differentiation, identification
and projection. He thus argues that Bhabha’s code of displaced repetition is too
restrictive “given the plurality of forms of social difference (especially class and
gender) making up the world they represent” (199).6 To reduce this general
structure to the temporal logic of the
“postcolonial,” he argues, leaves it
open to a formalist reading which risks the “danger of reinstating] original dif
ference across its supposed temporal rupture” (199).
In a similar
speaking from within the discipline of postcolonial stud
ies, Gayatri Spivak has argued that universal applications of postcoloniality
conflate internal and the various different heritages and operations of coloniza
tion in the rest of the world. The stories of the postcolonial world, she writes,
are not necessarily the same as the stories coming from “‘internal colonization
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the patterns of exploitation and domination of disenfranchised groups with
in the United States” (Outside 278). Other critics have also charged not only
Bhabha, but postcolonial criticism in general, for not being forthright about
their relation to contemporary capitalism. Arif Dirlik and Aijaz Ahmad,
instance, see postcolonial criticism answering the conceptual
presented
by transformations in global relationships within the capitalist world.7 Others
still, have criticized Bhabha for reintroducing an unexamined totality through
the back door “by projecting globally what are but local experiences,” for leav
ing unexamined the heterogeneity of colonial power, and for being complicitous
in the production of ameliorative metaphors of the problems of colonialism in
the beyond and not in the here and now.8
It is very difficult to imagine a “new time” in the present.9 Any such
prophecy always runs the risk of being implicated in the very vision of the
future that it seeks to avoid. The future, that is, as transparent becoming that
must establish itself in relation to an ever-expanding and temporally heteroge
neous past. It appears that despite
critique of Foucault's work as ethnocen
tric, Bhabha also “falls prey to the notion of the cultural’ as a social formation
whose discursive doubleness ... is contained in a temporal frame that makes
differences repetitively contemporaneous’” (243). He offers time-lag to “cut
[modernity] off from its empirical origins and original motivations” so that he
“cleanse it of its imaginary complicities,” to cite Foucault (4). But, in the
process, as the critiques above indicate, his vision of a postcolonial contra
modernity also “makes differences repetitively contemporaneous.”
Both time-lag and past projection, his tools for slowing down the forward
movement of modernity so that the past and its symbols can
projected for
ward in the future and circulated in the present, are useful in changing the nar
ve of modernity. How useful are they, though,
for changing the present, for
place

creating a radical break with history and inaugurating a new time not only for
criticism but also for life? Both projection and time-lag are the characteristic
symptoms of nostalgia. Nostalgia is a composite of the Greek nostos (return)
and algos (sorrow). Jean Starobinski, points out that it was a word initially
coined as a medical term in 1688; it is a “pedantic neologism . . . invested with
the appropriate classical trappings” (Gourgouris 222). The prevalence of
Homer in the discourse of the West was probably crucial in the invention of
this word. Since in Homer, however, “the return home” was coupled with
desire, not sorrow, nostalgia is a relatively modern discourse, the inevitable part
of an Enlightenment world.10 A world, that is, which defines its time through
differentiation, identification and projection with a past or a place, which, by
the fact that it is the product of the subject’s projection, exists as the fantasy of
the real for which the subject then longs. Renato Rosaldo, in
investigation
of representational violence in modern nostalgia, has demonstrated how this
seemingly innocent sentiment masks the cultural expression of dominance that
he calls “imperialist nostalgia.” “Imperialist nostalgia,” he explains, “uses a pose
of 'innocent yearning’ both to capture people’s imaginations and to conceal its
complicity with often brutal domination” (70). He argues that in Euro-Amer
ican modernity imperialist nostalgia erases collective responsibility and replaces
it and personal responsibility with powerful discursive practices through which
the past is perceived or narrativized as another
or culture.
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Because Bhabha's nostalgia does not long for or does not try to forget or to
sublate a past but aches for a future, it is not imperialist but utopian: it longs
for a present that is not yet present, a time when we all know what it
to
live, to be, in other times and different spaces, both human and historical”
(256). As such, it is the
longing for a return to nowhere. The tem
plate of this nowhere in the discourse on modernity, Bhabha himself argues, is
the colonial space (246). According to him, it is this nowhere that the “subal
terns and ex-slaves” seize in order to rewrite modernity’s narrative and to trans
form the center of thought and writing (246). And, it is this nowhere that he
seems to be nostalgic for, treating it as if it is already past, when contemporary
realities — and his own argument of its displaced repetition in the postcolonial
—
us that it is very much in the present.11
Nostalgia for utopia is quintessentially paradoxical.12 Both past and future,
it is outside history — the history of the present. Outside history, “neither tele
ological nor ... endless slippage,” neither fixed (nostalgia) nor always in motion
(utopia), it holds the place of the historical sublime (253). This is a highly
aporetic move, despite Bhabha’s differentiation of his “genealogy for post
modernity” from Eurocentric ones that posit it as “the aporetic’ history of the
Sublime” which he criticizes for “merely chang[ing] the narratives of our histo
ries” and not our sense of what it means to in other times and places (251).13
For this sense to change, the conditions of possibility that he envisions must be
produced in the present and not in the retrospective past or projective future.
The answer to my question whether it is possible to break with the past, based
on my reading of Bhabha’s work, is a clear “no.” This does not mean, however
that the tools that he gives us are useless, as Osborne argues. If we see
work
as a “re-occupation” (remembering Blumenberg) of the discourse on moderni
ty, that is, if we understand that the content of
work is new but that its func
tion is not, then, we can begin to understand that continuity is not the sign of
backwardness that Foucault makes it to be in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
Nor is it the sign of “the history of modernity’s antique dreams,” as Bhabha
reads it (250). Rather, to paraphrase Bhabha’s definition of time-lag, it is the
means through which the making of the past is kept alive (254).
The foremost symbol of continuity in Western culture has been Greece.
Making up “our” everyday, according to Henri Lefebvre, its function in the dis
course of the West has been to represent both history’s totality and its radical
incompleteness. “When we question Greece,
are questioning a historically
tested utopianism,” he writes in Introduction to Modernity, his highly poetic
attempt to think the new (226). “In Greece we recognize our own problems,”
he continues, “ we want to know how our problems differ from hers” (226227). For Lefebvre “Greece alone caught a glimpse of the total man, vitality,
harmony — and let them slip away” (226). For him the questions of
Greece make up “our” everyday which he defines, in Critique ofEveryday Life,
as that which is most phenomenologically familiar, hence least differentiated,
and sociologically residual (97). Greece, thus, defines modernity. Consistent
ly throughout the process of this form’s constitution — either as the specific
“antiquity” or the more general “tradition” — Greece has figured as the univer
sal that Europe needed to either signify an irreversible break from, or project a
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movement forward towards, in its process of self-totalization. It was also the
universal that Europe used to signify the qualitative difference of its universal
ity from that which it projected onto Greece. Simultaneously reconstructed
and dismantled in the dream of recovering lost origins and inaugurating new
times, Greece has been the site of the West’s “phantasmatic reconstitution,” its
“dream nation,” to cite Stathis Gourgouris (157). The examples are countless.
In England, from the late eighteenth century when it began to displace Rome
as the point of origin of English culture to the nineteenth century when, as cul
tural fantasy, it served as its model, Greece consistently was evoked as the his
torical abstraction that ensured the concreteness of English “civility.”14 In the
S. today, despite the efforts of multiculturalist and postcolonialist critics to
question the universal validity of Eurocentric norms, Greece still tends to rep
resent “our civility.” Neo-conservative public intellectuals like William Bennett
and conservative critics like Roger Kimball see the efforts of multiculturalism
as a direct attack on patriotism, democracy, and civilization. Kimball argues
that “despite our many differences, we hold in common an intellectual, artistic,
and moral legacy, descending largely from the Greeks and the Bible, [that] pre
serves us from chaos and barbarism” (postscript)
Located in this impossible position, Greece is an example of what Michel
de Certeau calls the “originary non-place” from which all historiographical pro
jects begin (90-91). Both utopian — in that it harbored the promise of a con
crete universality — and empirical — in that it offered a critique of the present
— Greece is the category of historical analysis with which the West’s myth of
progress was rendered into logos. It is also the category with which current
postcolonial demystifications of that logos (embedded as they are in it, even as
its negation) map their ideal future. Thus, when exploring “the history of
modernity’s antique dreams” in an attempt to revise modernity,
must look at
not only “the writing out of the colonial and postcolonial moment,” as suggest
by Homi Bhabha, but also at the writing in of “antiquity” (253). It too con
tains erasures. Of the many examples which support this point, I will trace this
function of Greece in two of the most influential critiques of the historiography
of modernity: Henri Lefebvre’s Introduction to Modernity and Edward Said’s
Orientalism. Said’s work is part of the discourse of postcolonial contra-moder
nity, in fact, it is one of its founding texts. Lefebvre’s is part of the discourse
which rethinks the modern as the “everyday.” Lefebvre was instrumental in
inaugurating this discourse in
concretizing of Marx’s concept of alienation
as “critical knowledge of the everyday,” and as such he is a forerunner of cultur
al studies.15 Both critics address the production and temporalization of history
by and as modernity not only as an existential but also a social process embed
ded in material processes. Yet, both stumble when it comes to
“Greece alone concerns us,” writes Lefebvre in Introduction to Modernity
(2). “Our dialogue with other eras, with India or the Orient, is marginal . . .
Greece, the original source, offers the only ideal and the only idea of man’s pos
sibilities . . . Greece is the yardstick against which we measure our own selfknowledge” (226). I hardly need to mention the large body of work (mostly
from postcolonial studies) which shows that the dialogue with India and the
Orient was indeed central to Europe’s self-constitution. I also hardly need to
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mention the even larger body of work on Greece as origin, the litany is much
too long and all too familiar. I will repeat the crux of it using Lefebvre as the
mouthpiece:
It was Greece which created historical thought and political thought.
Greek philosophers discovered active reason, based on social praxis.
They gave language a form; they elaborated its theoretical and practical
categories. By mediating on its social and political effectiveness, they
brought the essentials of social and political praxis to the logos. . . .
They also sensed the limits of the logos. They posed all the problems.
They tried all the directions.
(226)

According to Lefebvre’s listing of its virtues, Greece was “modern,” before all of
“us.” Sounding quite Habermasian in his definition of modernity as
autonomous
he tells us that, for a brief moment at least, Greece had
“confidence in the universal logos and in the power of the rational” (228). Yet,
he also tells us that it is the tradition against which we define our modernity. It
is “a vast, imaginary screen,” the “region of the past” with which “we”
“our present age” in the hopes of founding a “new Greece” (226). Here, in this
contradiction between modernity as qualitative and modernity as chronologi
cal, Lefebvre betrays his argument of Greece’s modernity as his own and per
forms what Foucault calls “the most touching of treasons”: he suppresses the
very question of the “historicity of the thought of the universal” (“Kant” 95).
Ironically, his work’s
is to trace this very historicity. Both Introduction
to Modernity and the larger project of which it is a part — his critique of every
day life, a project that he pursued for over fifty years — have as their political
aim the social production of possibility at the level of historical time, the time
of the everyday.16 He writes in Critique ofEveryday Life: the everyday is “pro
foundly related to all activities, and encompasses them with all their differences
and their conflicts; it is their meeting place, their bond, their common
ground”(97). As such it is the partially realized form of the unrealized univer
sality of the species as opposed to the abstract but realized universality of its
alienated forms (money, the commodity, the state). In Introduction to Moderni
ty, the metaphor for this real yet radically incomplete totality is Greece:
“Greece alone caught a glimpse of the total man, vitality, reason, harmony —
and let them slip away.” Thus for Lefebvre it functions both as a realized
abstraction against which “we” define ourselves, and a concrete, though fleet
ing, example of the unalienated universality of the “good” universal, i.e. the
unrealized universality of the species. He goes into the realm of culture to make
point. Defining ourselves against this realized abstraction, he
us, leads
to classicism while, at the same time, as an example of the good universal, this
abstraction powers romanticism. He defines classicism and romanticism not
narrowly as artistic movements but as “totalities” — partially realized systems
of thought. “Without some kind of concrete unity,” he explains, “neither clas
sicism nor romanticism
have created the aesthetic world’ they needed in
which to exercise their own creativity” (326).
the underlying unity (the
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“yardstick”) which accompanies all differentiation and furnishes it with its
social meaning, Greece provides classicism and romanticism with their identi
ty. “
classicism,” he continues, “it is the goal, something to be achieved by
the
of passion and imagination. It is recognizable and repeatable. For
romanticism, unity remains a possibility, and nothing more” (326). In both
instances Greece is the realized abstraction, the “non-place,” that allows the
present to take its shape as a partially realized totality that needs to be “'present
ed” that is, “made present" (327). In so doing, Greece continues to bring “social
and political praxis to the
” (226).
For Lefebvre, then, the example of Greece helps us analyze dialectical
movements, like the one found in the conflictive relationship between classi
cism and romanticism. It also helps restore “vitality, harmony, and reason” in
our present time and free modernity from mystifications like the ones found in
all sorts of modernisms (including postmodernism). As the above account of
his characterization of its function in the present shows, Lefebvre uses Greece
to take issue with aesthetically centered or purely epistemological symboliza
tions of the present. “This period which sees and calls itself entirely new,” he
complains, “is overcome by an obsession with the past:
history. His
tory begins . . . with the here-and-now, with each passing minute. Historical
becoming is immediately upon us, and immediately it becomes history” (224).
“We are overloaded with fragmented pieces of unarticulated information, the
of the past, knowledge as scrap-yard” (225). “Myths are back,” he con
tinues, “and with them the philosophy of myths and reflection of myths. No
one seems to see the disconcerting aspects of it all: a reliance on a form of
thought and a profound sensibility which, though uprootable, is untransplantable” (330). And finally, showing his strong critique of unhistoricized uni
versalism, or classicism without the contradiction of romanticism, he writes,
“classicism turns myths into allegories; it freezes them to death” (326).
How ironic that, despite his criticism of such a process, he also allegorizes
Greece, literally creates it as the space of the other, the “mythic zero” of moder
nity’s (and his own) historiographical project, the thing that allows him to “pre
sent” modernity. For the Marxist Lefebvre, “presenting” atemporality is of the
utmost importance because, in its dialectic with the partially realized universal
ity of the everyday, it rehistoricizes
and drives away the abstraction
that leads to alienation. This disruption of atemporality, however, together
with the hoped for “presenting,”
lead to the retrospective construction of
images of the integrity of the past. His argument of the “totality” of Greece is
one instance of such retrospection. Greece for him is at once empirical and
utopian. It is empirical in that it offers a critique of everyday life in the present
and utopian in that it harbors the promise of a concrete universality. For Lefeb
vre, Greece’s power lies in the disjunction between these two aspects. Yet, this
is where its misrepresentations lie also. Lefebvre’s own misrepresentation is
obvious in the contradiction between his insistence on Greece’s historical speci
ficity and his treatment of it as an abstraction, an alienated one at that too.
How else would one explain “all the bad dreams, the nightmares, the forebod
ings about imminent catastrophe” that he sees together with his vision of the
myth of Greece? (227)

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol6/iss2/2

 

 



8





Koundoura: Reoccupying the Space of Culture: Greece and the Postcolonial Cri 135

Maria Koundoura

Postcolonial theory has analyzed these nightmares as the return of the
repressed and uncanny past, the product of “the writing out of the colonial and
postcolonial moment” from “the history of modernity’s antique dreams” (Bhab
ha
As with all analysis, however, there is always the risk of counter-trans
ference and the reinstitution of the nightmare, the re-inscription, as we saw in
Bhabha’s work, of modernity’s antique dreams as the visions of the future. Only
if the liminal space of the postcolonial remains exterior to history — a utopian
“non-place,” a projective past — can it provide the perspective of a completed
whole from which the present can appear as radically incomplete. When it
becomes part of history, it suffers the fate of Greece. Its record as a “histori
cally tested utopianism” (as we saw in Lefebvre) was the
through which
Western modernity replenished its images of totality (either through its identi
fication or through its difference from it).
This is the problem with liminality or the place in-between: it might be the
place of resistance, but it just as easily can seen as the place of complicity par
excellence.
de Certeau explains, a “non-place” is indispensable for any ori
entation but it cannot have a place in history because it is the principle that
organizes history (91). As such, it is the object upon which the subject projects
the values that constitute it, that is, produce it in time, without itself ever being
in time. “It could be said,” de Certeau continues, “that it is myth transformed
into a chronological postulate — at once erased from the narrative but every
where presupposed in it, impossible to eliminate” (91). And, he concludes: “A
necessary relation to the other, to this mythic zero,’ is still inscribed in the nar 
densewith all the transformations of genealogy, with all the modula 
ve content
tions of dynastic or familial historiestwo
concerning politics, economy, or mentali
ties” (91). Under the logic of de Certeau’s argument, while initially it was
Greece, its latest transformation places this postulate as the location in-between
of the postcolonial. Described by Bhabha as standing defiant against any hege
monic subscription to otherness, forever liminal and, as I have indicated, in
danger of being seen as the ground of complicity par excellence (much in the
same way that Greece
this space must be interrogated. “We are to look up
from this ground,” writes Stathis Gourgouris in his mapping of the nation as
the space of this otherness, “not to what beckons the utopian (like so many sec
ular prophets) but to what breaks into the space of the present time” (281). It
is my contention that what breaks into the present time of the postcolonial is
the ghost of Greece as Other.
Nowhere is the crossing of these
moments in the history of “the myth
ic zero” more evident than in one of colonial discourse analysis’s groundbreak
ing texts, Edward Said’s Orientalism. The contradiction between political
intent and critical practice, claims for a new narrativity and the reality of the
persistence of the old that this crossing produces, is reflected most clearly in his
treatment of Greece. Greece for him, contrary to his proclaimed Foucauldian
methodology, is both at and the origin of a seamless and unified European iden
tity and thought that is essentially the same from antiquity to today, only now
it is more
and complicated. His Auerbachian high humanism leads
to forget his own argument that this sense of continuity is an eighteenth-cen
tury fabrication that was materially consolidated in the nineteenth century.17
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Instead, he argues that the demarcation between Orient and West “already
seems bold by the time of the Iliad” (Said 56). “With Aeschylus’ The Persians
and Euripides’ The Bacchae, the first and last extant Greek play,” he continues,
“the two aspects of the Orient that set it off from the West . . . will remain
essential motifs of European imaginative geography.” “A line is drawn between
two continents,” he
“Europe is powerful and articulate; Asia is
defeated and distant” (57).
Clearly, the question of Greece’s function and location is central to Said’s
argument; it is also what complicates
argument. He begins his definitions
of orientalism by labeling as an orientalist anyone “who teaches, writes about,
or researches the Orient — and this applies whether the person is an anthro
pologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist” (2). He next defines orientalism
as situated beyond academic boundaries, as a mentality traversing a great many
centuries and functioning as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and
epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time)
‘the Occident’ ” and as such, capable of accommodating “Aeschylus ... and Vic
tor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx” (2-3). And finally, he argues that it is “a
Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Ori
ent” (3). He then comes to his famous conclusion that without examining ori
entalism, “one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline
by which European culture was able to manage — and even produce — the
Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and
imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (3).
If one follows the temporal schema of his mutually incompatible defini
tions, orientalist discourse began in the post-Enlightenment period and, para
doxically, also with the tragedies of Aeschylus. It “derives from secularizing ele
ments in eighteenth-century European culture” (120), but it must also be
understood “not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient,
but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and
re-formed by such disciplines as philology” (122). This double genealogy at the
center of his historiographical project raises the question of the relationship
between orientalism and colonialism that, for Greece, is particularly crucial. If
post-Enlightenment Europe is cited as the origin of orientalism, then oriental
ism is an ideological aftermath of colonialism, and nineteenth-century Greece
under the “protection” of the European powers is a colonized space.18 This is
the genealogical strand in Said’s work that informs Stathis Gourgouris’s argu
ment in Dream Nation that Greece is an example (the only he tells us) of the
“colonization of the ideal.”19 If, on the other hand, European antiquity, and its
increasing influence from the Middle Ages onward, is cited as the origin of ori
entalism, then orientalism seems to be the essential element of the modern
European imagination. Under this scenario, Greece’s own appropriation by
Europe is forgotten in the name of its powerless but ideologically seductive (for
the Greeks) and, as we saw in the case of Lefebvre’s use of it, politically conve
nient (for the Europeans) institution as the origin of Western
After all,
this “other within” not only provides Europe with an identity but also with dif
ference (at the origin too!). Said’s merging of the ambivalent space that is
Greece with Europe, the power that has constructed it as “origin,” erases the
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present in the name of the epochal. Greece, the obstacle to his argument’s per
fect fit, becomes the victim of its teleology’s fearful symmetry: it must
ori
entalism’s place of origin so that the critique of Western culture and its origin
can be the end. Greece’s dual role, however, as part of “that hostile other world”
(56) that is the Orient and, in that it offers the “essential motifs of European
imaginative cartography” (57), part of Europe, makes it what he identifies as
the “otherwise silent and familiar space beyond familiar boundaries” (57).
understand this contradiction at the heart of Said’s work one has to turn
to Hans Blumenberg’s concept of “reoccupation.” Through it, one could argue
that his “contrapuntal” project in Orientalism, while helpful in contesting the
grand, continuist narratives of modernity, is not a break from but an example of
modernity’s basic temporal structure of historical self-definition through differ
entiation, identification, and projection. As Bhabha has argued, criticizing this
internal contradiction in Said’s intention and method, “the terms in which
Orientalism is unified — the intentionality and unidirectionality of colo
nial power — also unify the subject of colonial enunciation” (71). The example
of Greece’s double placement at both the origin and the end of Western culture
demonstrates that this subject is not unified at all. Understood not as a break
but as a “reoccupation” of modernity’s disjunctive form,
can argue that
entalism offers alternative temporalities in its content: it redefines the site of the
enunciation of the “modern” and
the colonial character of its origin. At
the same time, one can also argue that it is affected by the European discourse
on modernity in the function which that content is forced to perform: the func
tion, that is, of inscribing the spatial logic of social differences across a common
temporal frame (despite its intentions not to). Clearly, in order to avoid the
temporal homogenizing of social differences, Orientalism, as one of the found
ing texts on the postcolonial translation of modernity,
to “re-occupy” the
function that its content is forced to perform. To do so, such work
to
examine its own historiographical operation and situate its own “originary non
place.” In other words, it
to analyze the dialectical movement between
itself and the critical discourse on modernity so that it
free itself from the
baggage of aesthetically centered — or “modernist” in Lefebvre’s sense —
interpretations of the present. Only then can we enter the “new time” promised
by the postcolonial translation of modernity. The time, that is, in which we
know “what it means to live, to be, in other places and different spaces, both
human and historical” (Bhabha 256).

Notes
1. Bhabha’s “Conclusion” in The Location of Culture, 250, was first published as
“’’Race’, Time and the Revision of Modernity” in Oxford Literary Review 13
(1991): 193-219. My page numbers refer to the book.
2. See Anderson, (96 -113), Jameson, “Postmodernism” (59-92).
3. This question plagues every claim of newness, including Marxism’s own.
Marxist definitions of modernity are themselves not immune to criticism the
most relevant being that they neglect problems in the philosophy of history.
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“Postmodernism, one might say,” Peter Osborne writes in The Politics of Time,
“is the revenge of the philosophical discourse of modernity upon Marxism
neglecting problems in the philosophy of history” (ix).
4. Osborne’s is the most serious and most comprehensive of these critiques.
5. “Insofar as it is the name for both
existential and a social process, as well
as a project of theoretical elaboration,” Osborne writes, “modernity,’ must be
understood to embrace dimensions of temporalization beyond the purely enundative present of the sign” (199).
6. In Questions ofTravel in chapter four, “Feminist Politics of Location,” Caren
Kaplan offers an overview of gender and class informed accounts of postcolo
nial modernity that functions as a supplement to Osborne’s critique but also as
answer.
7. See Dirlik and Ahmad.
8. Dirlik (514), Parry (27-58). For a response to Parry’s critique see my 1989
interview with Gayatri Spivak for the Stanford Humanities Review Vol. 1.1
(Spring 1989): 84-97.
9 Especially, as Reinhart Koselleck shows us in
survey of the semantic his
tory of the concept of “new time” in Futures Pasts, after the Enlightenment
divorced the concept of “new time” from any fixed referent.
10. This is
of the central arguments in Theodor Adorno’s and Max
Horkheimer’s Dialectic ofEnlightenment.
11. Other postcolonial critics have also noted its presence. Kwame Anthony
Appiah points to the pitfalls of assuming that postcolonial
going beyond
colonialism. “Many areas of contemporary African cultural life” — he writes
in “ the Post-’ in Postcolonial’ the Post-’ in “Postmodern?” — “are not in this
way concerned with transcending — with going beyond — coloniality.” In
Anne McClintock, et. al. Dangerous Liaisons (432). Achille Mbembe, in his
response to Appiah, argues that the reason for this lack of “going beyond” is the
forgetting of colonialism’s memories that has begun to set in postcolonial soci
eties after the initial period of decolonization (353).
12. Gourgouris writes: “In being nowhere, utopia has access to everywhere, a
vision in motion always in the process of seeking a place. On the other hand,
nostalgia, by virtue of its tremendous concentration on the trajectory of return,
aims constantly at a fixed space” (224).
13. The ascendancy of postcolonialism in cultural criticism (obvious in the
rapid
of the field of postcolonial studies in the American academy in the
1980s) has been seen as the result of its affiliations with the emergent con
sciousness of global capitalism in the 1980s. Dirlik has argued that “the appeals
of the critical themes in postcolonial criticism have much to do with their res
onance with the conceptual
presented by transformations in global rela
tionships due to changes within the capitalist world economy” (502-503). The
success of the “feeling” for the postcolonial must also be seen as the result of its
affiliation with the libidinal economy of postmodernity as “the aporetic’ histo
ry of the sublime.”
14. For good representative accounts of the
of Hellenism by eigh
teenth-century England see Clarke’s Rediscovering Hellenism.
15. “Cultural studies” in the way Jameson reads it as a particular desire. He
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approaches it politically and socially as the desire to constitute a “historic bloc”
(“On Cultural Studies” 251).
16. The central piece in that project are the three volumes of Critique ofEvery
day Life, Foundation of a Sociology of Everydayness (1962),From Modernity to
Modernism: Towards a Metaphilosophy ofthe Everyday (1981). See also The Pro
duction of Space.
17. For a negative account of how these two different positions (Foucauldian
methodology and Auerbachian Humanism) manifest themselves in Said’s work
see Ahmad (159-219). Although Ahmads critique is harsh.— it received a
vociferous critical response in Public Culture 6.1 (1993) — it provides a useful
reminder of the importance of class in race, ethnicity and culture studies which
tend to aestheticize displacement. One can say that for a diasporic cosmopoli
tan intellectual schooled in the same
Euro-American institutions as
critics,
cannot help but write criticism that can only reflect the tensions
and complexities of this social history. This
is the argument that Aamir
Mufti also comes
even though he criticizes Ahmad for misreading Said’s use
of Auerbach. See Mufti, “Auerbach in Istanbul” (95-125).
18. For England’s and the other “Great
’” influence and “protection” of
Greece, see Richard Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question.
19. “If the story of India,” he writes “is the paradigmatic condition of the colo
nialist imaginary, then the story of Greece is the paradigmatic colonialist con
dition in the imaginary.” “These two stories have a common history,” he con
tinues, “the refracted history of‘Europe’” (6).
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